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a b s t r a c t
Restrictions on insurance risk classification may induce adverse selection, which is usually perceived
as a bad outcome. We suggest a counter-argument to this perception in circumstances where modest
levels of adverse selection lead to an increase in ‘loss coverage’, defined as expected losses compensated
by insurance for the whole population. This happens if the shift in coverage towards higher risks
under adverse selection more than offsets the fall in number of individuals insured. The possibility of
this outcome depends on insurance demand elasticities for higher and lower risks. We state elasticity
conditionswhich ensure that for any downward-sloping insurance demand functions, loss coveragewhen
all risks are pooled at a common price is higher than under fully risk-differentiated prices. Empirical
evidence suggests that these conditions may be realistic for some insurance markets.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Restrictions on insurance risk classification are common in life
and health insurance markets. In the US, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act permits classification only by age, lo-
cation, family size and smoking status; in the European Union,
gender classification in insurance pricing has been banned; and
many countries have restricted insurers’ use of genetic test results.
Whilst such restrictions appear motivated by social objectives,
they may also induce adverse selection, which is usually perceived
as a bad outcome.
A simple version of the usual argument is as follows. If insurers
are not permitted to charge risk-differentiated prices, they have to
pool different risks at a common pooled price. This pooled price
is cheap for higher risks and expensive for lower risks; so more
insurance is bought by higher risks, and less insurance is bought
by lower risks. The equilibrium pooled price of insurance is higher
than a population-weighted average of true risk premiums. Also,
in most markets the number of higher risks is smaller than the
number of lower risks, so the total number of risks insured falls.
However, the rise in equilibrium price under pooling reflects a
shift in coverage towards higher risks. If the shift in coverage is
large enough, it can more than offset the fall in numbers insured.
In these circumstances, despite fewer risks being insured under
pooling, expected losses compensated by insurance – a quantity
we term ‘loss coverage’ – can be higher. We argue that where
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risk classification restrictions lead to higher ‘loss coverage’ – that
is, more risk being voluntarily transferred and more losses being
compensated – then from a social perspective, this should be seen
as a good outcome from adverse selection.
The argument just given relies on a possibility, not a certainty.
Whether the shift in coverage towards higher risks when risk
classification is restricted is in fact large enough to offset the fall
in numbers insured depends on the response of higher and lower
risks to changes in the prices they face: the demand elasticities
of higher and lower risks. This paper explores the relationship
between insurance demand elasticities and loss coverage. Our
main results state, for a sequence of increasingly general demand
specifications and any number of risk-groups, the elasticity condi-
tions which ensure that loss coverage will be higher when all risks
are pooled at a common price than under fully risk-differentiated
premiums.
This paper is related to previous literature as follows. Thomas
(2008) first suggested loss coverage as a possible criterion for
evaluating risk classification schemes, with illustrative examples
generated using an exponential-power demand model suggested
in De Jong and Ferris (2006). Hao et al. (2016a) gave a compre-
hensive mathematical analysis, but only for the case of iso-elastic
demand with two risk-groups. Hao et al. (2016b), again focusing
on iso-elastic demand, reconciled the concept of loss coverage to
utilitarian concepts of social welfare found in related economic
literature on risk classification, such as Hoy (2006), Einav and
Finkelstein (2011) and Dionne and Rothschild (2014).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a
simple example which further clarifies and motivates the concept
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of loss coverage. Section 3 outlines our micro-founded model for
insurance demand, where variations between individuals in utility
functions lead to an aggregate proportional insurance demand
between0 and1; this corresponds to the observable reality that not
all individuals with the same probabilities of loss make the same
insurance purchasing decisions. Section 4 sets up the model of
risk classification, insurancemarket equilibrium and loss coverage.
Section 5 establishes demand elasticity conditions for loss cover-
age to be higher under pooling than under risk-differentiated pre-
miums, for three increasingly general specifications of insurance
demand. Section 6 discusses how these conditions compare with
empirical estimates of demand elasticities from various authors,
and Section 7 gives conclusions.
2. Simple example
The concept of loss coverage has been described elsewhere
(Thomas (2008, 2009, 2017); Hao et al. (2016a, b)) butmay remain
unfamiliar tomany readers, so this section gives a recap. In essence,
the concept encapsulates an argument that the adverse selection
induced by a ban on insurance risk classification can sometimes be
beneficial for society as a whole.
The argument can be illustrated with a simple example, in the
same spirit as dice-rolling examples to illustrate probability laws.
Consider a population of just ten risks (say lives), and three alter-
native scenarios for risk classification: risk-differentiated premi-
ums, pooled premiums (with some adverse selection), and pooled
premiums (with severe adverse selection). We assume that all
losses and insurance cover are for unit amounts (this simplifies
the discussion, but it is not necessary). We assume the probability
of loss is unaffected by the purchase of insurance (i.e. no moral
hazard). The three scenarios are represented in the three panels
of Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, eachH represents one higher risk and each L represents
one lower risk. The population has the typical predominance of
lower risks: a lower risk-group of eight risks each with probability
of loss 0.01, and a higher risk-group of two risks each with prob-
ability of loss 0.04. In each scenario, the shaded cover above some
of the H and L denote the risks covered by insurance.
In Scenario 1, risk-differentiated premiums (actuarially fair pre-
miums) are charged. The proportion of each risk-groupwhich buys
insurance under these conditions is 50%, in line with industry
statistics for e.g. life insurance.1 The shading shows that a total of
five risks are covered. Note that the equal areas of shading over four
low risks and over one high risk symbolise equal expected losses.
The weighted average of the premiums paid is (4 × 0.01 +
1 × 0.04)/5 = 0.016. Since higher and lower risks are insured in
the same proportions as they exist in the population, there is no
adverse selection. The expected losses compensated by insurance
for the whole population can be indexed by:
Loss coverage = Expected compensated losses
Expected population losses
= 4× 0.01+ 1× 0.04
8× 0.01+ 2× 0.04 = 50%. (1)
In Scenario 2, in the middle panel of Fig. 1, risk classification
has been banned, and so insurers have to charge a common pooled
premium to both higher and lower risks. Higher risks buymore in-
surance, and lower risks buy less. The weighted average premium
1 Some relevant industry statistics are as follows. The Life Insurance Market Re-
search Organisation (LIMRA) states that 44% of US households have some individual
life insurance (LIMRA (2013)). The US adult population (aged 18 years and over) at 1
July 2013 as estimated by the US Census Bureau was 244 m; the American Council
of Life Insurers states that 144 m (59%) individual policies were in force in 2013
(ACLI, 2014, p72)
is (1 × 0.01 + 2 × 0.04)/3 = 0.03. The shading shows that three
risks (compared with five previously) are now covered.
Note that theweighted average premium is higher in Scenario 2,
and the number of risks insured is smaller. These are the essential
features of adverse selection, which Scenario 2 accurately and
completely represents. But there is a surprise: despite the adverse
selection in the second scenario, the expected losses compensated
by insurance for the whole population are now larger. Visually,
this is symbolised by the larger area of shading in Scenario 2.
Arithmetically, the loss coverage is:
Loss coverage = 1× 0.01+ 2× 0.04
8× 0.01+ 2× 0.04 = 56%. (2)
We argue that Scenario 2, with a higher expected fraction of
the population’s losses compensated by insurance – higher loss
coverage – is superior from a social viewpoint to Scenario 1. The
superiority of Scenario 2 arises not despite adverse selection, but
because of adverse selection.
However, a ban on risk classification can also reduce loss cover-
age, if the adverse selection which the ban induces becomes too
severe. This possibility is illustrated in Scenario 3, in the lower
panel of Fig. 1. Adverse selection has progressed to the point where
only one higher risk, and no lower risks, buys insurance. Visually,
the lower loss coverage is symbolised by the smaller area of shading
in Scenario 3. Arithmetically, the loss coverage is:
Loss coverage = 1× 0.04
8× 0.01+ 2× 0.04 = 25%. (3)
These scenarios suggest that banning risk classification can
increase loss coverage if it induces the ‘right amount’ of adverse
selection (Scenario 2), but reduce loss coverage if it generates
‘too much’ adverse selection (Scenario 3). Which of Scenario 2 or
Scenario 3 actually prevails depends on the demand elasticities of
higher and lower risks. Hence it is of interest to explore the demand
elasticity conditions under which loss coverage is increased by a
ban on risk classification.
3. Insurance demand
In the simple example, the possibility of an increase in loss
coverage when risk classification was banned depended on the
fact that not all higher-risk individuals chose to buy insurance
at an actuarially fair premium. This corresponds to the reality of
voluntary insurance markets (e.g. see the figures in Footnote 1).
But it is not consistent with typical theories of insurance demand,
which imply that all individuals will purchase full insurance if
offered an actuarially fair premium (e.g. Mossin (1968)). This
section presents a theory of insurance demand which accommo-
dates the observable reality that not all individuals with the same
probabilities of loss make the same insurance purchasing decision.
In Hao et al. (2016a), we assumed that some fixed proportion
of individuals in each risk-group purchased insurance, consistent
with the observation that in voluntary insurance markets, many
individuals do not buy insurance. Thus, the model of insurance
purchasing was at the level of the collective. In Hao et al. (2016b),
we provided a micro-foundation for the collective model, based
on personal utilities. We assumed that personal utilities within a
risk-group are heterogeneous, so that different persons will make
different decisions, when offered the same insurance premium.
If the heterogeneity of utilities can be described in terms of a
probability distribution, then the collective decision model of Hao
et al. (2016a) can be recovered in terms of expected values.
This micro-foundation provides the ‘back-story’ for the pro-
portional insurance demand functions which we use in Section 4
onwards. Because the ‘back-story’ is not the primary focus of this
paper, the presentation here will be succinct. For a comprehensive
account of the full probabilistic model underpinning this formula-
tion, please refer to Hao et al. (2016b).
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Fig. 1. Three scenarios for risk classification.
Source: Adapted with permission
from Thomas (2017).
3.1. Micro-foundations: heterogeneity in individual risk preferences
Consider an individual with initial wealth W , who risks losing
an amount of L (with L ≤ W ) with probability µ. Suppose wealth
preferences are governed by the utility function U(w), which is in-
creasing in wealth w, i.e. U ′(w) > 0. (Individuals are typically also
assumed to be risk-averse i.e. U ′′(w) < 0, but our theory of insur-
ance demand does not require that all individuals are risk-averse.)
Suppose that the individual is offered insurance providing full
cover against the potential loss amount L at premium π per unit
of loss, i.e. for a payment of πL. (In this paper we do not consider
partial cover.) She will choose to buy insurance if π is low enough
to satisfy:
U(W − πL) > (1− µ)U(W )+ µU(W − L). (4)
Now consider a group of individuals, all with the same initial
wealth W and the same potential loss amount L (both fixed and
with L ≤ W ). Then in the above model, all individuals with the
same probability of loss µ make the same purchasing decision,
depending only on whether or not the offered premium π is
small enough to satisfy Eq. (4). In reality, it appears implausible
that all individuals with the same probability of loss make the
same purchasing decision (e.g. for life insurance, see the figures in
footnote 1).
A possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that
risk preferences are heterogeneous (see e.g. Finkelstein and Mc-
Garry (2006); Cutler et al. (2008)).2 That is, in a risk-group inwhich
2 Two other possible explanations for different purchasing decisions by individ-
uals with the same probabilities of loss who are offered the same premium are
variations across individuals in initial wealth W , and variations across individuals
in the potential loss amount L. We do not consider these explanations in this paper.
all individuals have the same risk µ, individuals may have differ-
ent utility functions. Suppose for simplicity that utility functions
belong to a family parameterised by a positive real number γ . So a
particular individual’s utility function can be denoted by Uγ (w).
Further suppose that, within the risk-group, γ is sampled ran-
domly from some random variable Γ with distribution function
FΓ (γ ). So, a particular individual’s utility function, Uγ (w), is a
randomquantity. Any numerical quantity involving an individual’s
utility function is therefore a random variable, the randomness
being inherited from the distribution FΓ (γ ).
Now, a single individual in the risk-group will choose to buy
insurance at premium π if and only if Eq. (4) is satisfied for their
particular utility function Uγ (w):
Uγ (W − πL) > (1− µ)Uγ (W )+ µUγ (W − L). (5)
Note that this behaviour is completely deterministic, assuming
that individuals know their own preferences.
Since decisions based on Eq. (5) do not depend on the origin and
scale of a utility function, we will find it convenient to assume that
all individuals have the same utility at the ‘end points’W − L and
W . The following standardisation is convenient: Uγ (W ) = 1 and
Uγ (W − L) = 0. Eq. (5) then becomes:
Uγ (W − πL) > (1− µ). (6)
The utility at the fixed wealth (W − πL) is a random variable,
that we denote by UΓ (W − πL), with a distribution function
induced by the random variable Γ .
We nowmake the key assumption, that while individuals know
their own utility function, this is unobservable to the insurer.
Insurers can observe the probability of loss µ, and naturally know
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the offered premium π , but within the risk-group the insurer
can at most observe the proportion of individuals who choose to
buy insurance. We call this a (proportional) demand function and
define it as:
d(π ) = P [UΓ (W − πL) > (1− µ)] (7)
where P denotes a probability.
Note that each individual’s decision is completely deterministic,
given their knowledge of their own utility function; but to the
insurer it appears stochastic, given what the insurer knows. In
respect of any individual chosen randomly, define the function Q
to be Q = 1 if they buy insurance or Q = 0 if they do not. To the
individual concerned, Q is a deterministic function. To the insurer,
Q is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter d(π ).
As a concrete example, Result A.1 of Appendix A shows the
iso-elastic demand function obtained in the case of power utility
functions parameterised by a random variable Γ with a specified
distribution.
A notable feature of thismodel is that demandwhen an actuari-
ally fair premium is charged can be less than 1. By permitting some
individuals to be ‘risk lovers’, the model can generate a demand
function consistent with the observation that not everyone buys
insurance (e.g. the figures in footnote 1). Although ‘risk-loving’ or
‘risk-seeking’ are the usual stylised descriptions, it suffices for our
model that some individuals, for whatever reason, do not purchase
insurance when offered an actuarially fair premium. Inmany cases
‘risk-neglecting’ might be a more realistic description than ‘risk-
seeking’.
Another possible explanation of some individuals’ non-
purchasing may be that an actuarially fair premium is, in practice,
not offered, i.e. premium loadings for expenses and profit. How-
ever, heterogeneity in risk aversion is a more flexible explanation,
in that it can explain why different individuals with the same
probabilities of loss and offered the same premiums may make
different decisions.
3.2. Aggregates: proportional demand and demand elasticities
The micro-foundations described above provide a possible
mechanism bywhich aggregate demand for insurance is generated
by the unobserved utility functions of individuals. In the remainder
of this paper, we work directly with the aggregate quantity, the
proportional demand d(π ) for insurance (0 ≤ d(π ) ≤ 1).
We now define a related concept, the (point price) elasticity of
insurance demand, as follows:
ϵ(π ) = −∂ log d(π )
∂ logπ
, so consequently: (8)
d(π ) = τ exp
[
−
∫ π
µ
ϵ(s) d log s
]
, (9)
where the parameter τ = d(µ) is the fair-premium demand for
insurance. The expression in Eq. (9) has the benefit that we do
not have to impose any regularity conditions, like continuity and
differentiability, on the demand function d(π ). We require only
that the demand elasticity ϵ(π ) in Eq. (8) is non-negative, so that
the demand d(π ) in Eq. (9) is non-increasing in premium π .
4. Equilibrium and loss coverage for two or more risk-groups
4.1. Framework for insurance risk classification
In Section 3, we suggested a model for insurance demand from
a group of individuals who all have the same probability of loss
but who may have different risk preferences. We call such a group
of individuals a risk-group. In this section, we extend the model to
a population consisting of several risk-groups with different loss
probabilities.
Suppose a population consists of n distinct risk-groups with
probabilities of loss given by µ1, µ2, . . . , µn. For convenience, we
assume that 0 < µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µn < 1.
Suppose the proportion of the population belonging to risk-
group i is pi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If we choose an individual at
random from the population, their probability of loss is a random
variable, which we denote by µ, and its distribution is given by
P[µ = µi] = pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose insurers chargepremiums (per unit of loss)π1, π2, . . . ,
πn for the risk-groups i = 1, 2, . . . , n, respectively. Based on the
model of Section 3, the demand for insurance within risk-group
i is denoted by di(πi), where 0 ≤ di(πi) ≤ 1 and di(πi) is non-
increasing in πi.
Let the insurance purchasing decision of an individual chosen at
random from thewhole population be represented by the indicator
random variable Q , taking the value of 1 if insurance is purchased;
and 0 otherwise. Within risk-group i, this has expectation:
E[Q | µ = µi ] = P[Q = 1 | µ = µi ] = di(πi) (10)
and the unconditional expectation (using the law of total expecta-
tion) is:
E[Q ] = E[ E[Q | µ ]] =
n∑
i=1
E[Q | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi]
=
n∑
i=1
di(πi)pi (11)
which represents the expected fraction of the whole population
who buy insurance, i.e. the expected demand for insurance.
Now suppose that the occurrence of a loss event for an individ-
ual chosen at random from thewhole population is represented by
the indicator randomvariable,X , taking the value of 1 if a loss event
occurs; and 0 otherwise. Within risk-group i, this has expectation:
E[ X | µ = µi ] = P[ X = 1 | µ = µi ] = µi (12)
and the unconditional expectation is:
E[X] =
n∑
i=1
E[ X | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi] =
n∑
i=1
µipi (13)
which represents the expected fraction of the population who
suffer a loss.
Conditional on µ = µi, we assume that Q and X are inde-
pendent. This ensures that there is no moral hazard; although the
level of risk may influence the decision to buy insurance, mediated
by di(πi), insured individuals in any risk-group have the same
probability of loss as uninsured individuals.
Now recall that the loss, if it occurs, is always of fixed amount L.
The insurance claim in respect of an individual chosen at random
from thewhole population is the cover indicator (Q ) times the loss
indicator (X) times the fixed loss amount (L). Using the fact that Q
and X are independent conditional on µ = µi, we have:
E[QXL] =
n∑
i=1
E[QXL | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi],
= L
n∑
i=1
E[Q | µ = µi ] E[ X | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi],
= L
n∑
i=1
di(πi)µipi. (14)
The above expression can alternatively be derived using the law of
total covariance.
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Next, define Π to be the premium which would be chargeable
to an individual chosen at random from the population, if that
individual purchased insurance. Then Π is a random variable,
taking values π1, π2, . . . , πn for individuals from risk-groups i =
1, 2, . . . , n, respectively. The premium income in respect of an
individual chosen at random from the whole population is the
cover indicator (Q ) times the premium (Π ) times the fixed loss
amount (L). Its expectation is:
E[QΠL] =
n∑
i=1
E[QΠL | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi],
= L
n∑
i=1
E[Q | µ = µi ] E[Π | µ = µi ] P[µ = µi],
= L
n∑
i=1
di(πi)πipi. (15)
We call any vector of premiums (π1, π2, . . . , πn) charged by
insurers a risk classification regime, and denote it by underlined
characters such as π . The insurer’s expected profit under risk
classification regime π , which we denote by ρ(π ) is then:
ρ(π ) = E[QΠL] − E[QXL]
= L
n∑
i=1
di(πi)πipi − L
n∑
i=1
di(πi)µipi. (16)
We assume that competition between insurers leads to zero profits
in equilibrium, that is ρ(π ) = 0. Dividing both sides by the fixed
loss amount Lwhich appears in Eq. (16), we can write this as
n∑
i=1
di(πi)pi(πi − µi) = 0 (17)
which we refer to as the equilibrium condition.
We also assume that competition drives all insurers to classify
risks to the maximum extent which regulation permits. Depend-
ing on applicable regulation, two polar cases of risk classification
regime are as follows:
• Full risk classification, under which πi = µi. Here, the
insurer uses the maximum possible degree of underwriting.
We denote this regime by π = µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn).
• No risk classification, or risk pooling, under which all πi =
π , a constant. Here, the insurer uses the minimum possible
degree of underwriting.
By considering the insurer’s profit under risk pooling with π = µ1
and π = µn, it is clear that there must be at least one risk pooling
regime which satisfies the equilibrium condition.3
4.2. Loss coverage
We define loss coverage under a risk classification π that sat-
isfies the equilibrium condition as the expected losses across the
whole population that are compensated by insurance, i.e. E[QXL]
as defined in Eq. (14). That is:
Loss coverage: LC(π ) = E[QXL], (18)
where ρ(π ) = 0.
3 In general, there may be more than one, and the results in this paper allow
for this possibility. But such multiple solutions do not arise for typical demand
functions and elasticities. For more details see Hao et al. (2016a) and Appendix
B of Thomas (2017). Between the polar cases of full risk classification and pooling,
many schemes of ‘partial risk classification’ are possible; for some general discus-
sion see Chapter 6 of Thomas (2017).
For comparison purposes we use loss coverage under full risk
classification regime as a reference level, and hence define the loss
coverage ratio as follows:
Loss coverage ratio: C = LC(π )
LC(µ)
. (19)
5. Impact of demand elasticities on loss coverage
In this section we investigate the impact of demand elasticities
for higher and lower risks on loss coverage ratio. For ease of
exposition we start with iso-elastic demand where all risk-groups
have the same elasticity λ, and use this as a stepping stone to prove
successively more general results.
5.1. Same iso-elastic demand elasticity for all risk-groups
Suppose the elasticity of demand is the same constant for all
individuals, irrespective of their risks and of the premium charged,
i.e. insurance demand is iso-elastic . So:
ϵi(π ) = λ (a positive constant), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (20)
The resulting demand function found from Eq. (9) is:
di(π ) = τi
(µi
π
)λ
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (21)
where the parameter τi = di(µi) is the fair-premium demand for
insurance, i.e. the demand when an actuarially fair premium is
charged. We assume τi < 1 for all risk-groups.
We note that for any risk-group, demand must logically be
subject to a cap of 1 (i.e. once the premium charged is low enough
so that all members of a risk-group buy insurance, further reduc-
tions in premium do not lead to further increases in demand). In
the present Section 5, we assume that demand formulae such as
Eq. (21) give a demand of less than 1 for all risk-groups at the
pooled premium. Where this is not the case, we will need to apply
a cap of 1 on demand; we discuss this in Section 6.1.
Based on iso-elastic demand as in Eq. (21), the equilibrium
condition in Eq. (17) under risk pooling with premium π0 gives:
n∑
i=1
piτi
(
µi
π0
)λ
(π0 − µi) = 0, or, equivalently: (22)
n∑
i=1
αi
(
µi
π0
)λ
=
n∑
i=1
αi
(
µi
π0
)λ+1
, (23)
where αi = piτi∑n
i=1 piτi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and the unique pooled equilibrium premium, π0, is given by:
π0 =
∑n
i=1 αiµ
λ+1
i∑n
i=1 αiµ
λ
i
. (24)
To facilitate mathematical proofs, it is helpful to re-frame
Eq. (23) as follows. Consider a random variable, V , taking values
vi = µiπ0 with probabilities αi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then Eq. (23) says
that under equilibrium, the random variable V satisfies:
E
[
V λ
] = E [V λ+1] . (25)
The loss coverage ratio, as defined in Eq. (19), comparing loss
coverage under pooled premiums to that under risk-differentiated
premiums, can be re-framed as:
C = LC(π0)
LC(µ)
=
∑n
i=1 αi
(
µi
π0
)λ
µi∑n
i=1 αiµi
=
∑n
i=1 αi
(
µi
π0
)λ+1
∑n
i=1 αi
(
µi
π0
)
= E
[
V λ+1
]
E [V ]
= E
[
V λ
]
E [V ]
. (26)
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Fig. 2. Loss coverage ratio as a function of demand elasticity for iso-elastic demand.
Fig. 2 shows the plot of loss coverage ratio as a function of
demand elasticity λ, for the risks (µ1, µ2) = (0.01, 0.04) and
the fair-premium demand shares (α1, α2) = (0.8, 0.2). We can
see that loss coverage under pooling is higher than under risk-
differentiated premiums if demand elasticity is less than 1, and vice
versa. The pattern shown in Fig. 2 is formally stated in the following
result:
Result 5.1. Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks µ1 < µ2 <
· · · < µn and the same iso-elastic demand elasticity λ. Then λ ⋚ 1⇒
C ⋛ 1.
This result generalises a result proved for only two risk-groups
in Hao et al. (2016a). A proof is given in Appendix B.
5.2. Different iso-elastic demand elasticities for different risk-groups
The assumption of constant iso-elastic demand elasticity for all
individuals, althoughmathematically tractable, can be criticised as
unrealistic. For most goods and services, we expect demand elas-
ticity to risewith price, because of the income effect on demand: at
higher prices, the good forms a larger part of the consumer’s total
budget constraint, and so the effect of a small percentage change in
its price might be larger. For insurance this suggests that demand
elasticity for higher risks (who are typically charged higher prices)
might be higher. So we next consider iso-elastic demand functions
with different demand elasticities for different risk-groups, i.e.:
ϵi(π ) = λi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n; (27)
where higher risk-groups are likely to have higher demand elastic-
ities. Under this formulation, the equilibrium condition under risk
pooling with premium π0 gives:
n∑
i=1
piτi
(
µi
π0
)λi
(π0 − µi) = 0, or, equivalently: (28)
n∑
i=1
αi
(
µi
π0
)λi
=
n∑
i=1
αi
(
µi
π0
)λi+1
. (29)
As in Section 5.1, we define a random variable V taking values
vi = µiπ0 with probabilities αi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Now, define a
function f (v), such that:
f (vi) = λi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (30)
Then the equilibrium condition, in Eq. (29), can be re-framed as:
E
[
V f (V )
] = E [V f (V )+1] , (31)
and loss coverage ratio can be expressed as:
C = E
[
V f (V )
]
E [V ]
. (32)
Under this setting, we have the following result:
Result 5.2. Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks µ1 < µ2 <
· · · < µn with iso-elastic demand elasticities λ1, λ2, . . . , λn respec-
tively. Define λlo = maxv≤1f (v) and λhi = minv>1f (v). Then λlo <
1 and λhi ≥ λlo ⇒ C ≥ 1.
To understand this result, note that under pooled equilibrium,
λlo is the maximum of the demand elasticities of all those lower
risk-groups who pay more premium, π0, than their actuarially fair
risk µ. So, λlo < 1 signifies that, for these lower risk-groups,
their iso-elastic demand elasticities should be less than 1, which is
consistent with empirical evidence in many markets (as discussed
in Section 6 of this paper).
On the other hand, λhi is the minimum of the demand elas-
ticities of all those higher risk-groups who pay less premium, π0,
than their actuarially fair risk, µ. The interpretation of the second
condition, λhi ≥ λlo, is that for these higher risk-groups, the
demand elasticities should be larger than those of all the lower risk-
groups, which is consistent with what we expect from the income
effect on demand.
In summary, as long as the iso-elastic demand elasticities of
the different risk-groups satisfy the two conditions: λlo < 1 and
λhi ≥ λlo, the loss coverage under pooling is higher than under full
risk classification.
The following special cases of Result 5.2 are worth noting:
1. If the iso-elastic demand elasticities are the same for all risk-
groups, i.e. λi = λ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then by definition
λlo = λhi = λ, and so λlo = λ < 1 gives C ≥ 1, which
corresponds to Result 5.1.
2. For the special case of: 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λn < 1, the
two conditions, λlo < 1 and λhi ≥ λlo, are trivially satisfied
and hence in this case: C ≥ 1.
3. For the case of two risk-groups, λlo = λ1 and λhi = λ2, and
the conditions on the demand elasticities translate toλ1 < 1
and λ2 ≥ λ1.
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Fig. 3. Curve demarcating the regions where loss coverage ratio is greater than and less than 1 when (µ1, µ2) = (0.01, 0.04) and (α1, α2) = (0.8, 0.2).
The two risk-groups case is illustrated in Fig. 3, where
(µ1, µ2) = (0.01, 0.04) and (α1, α2) = (0.8, 0.2). The two axes
represent λ1 and λ2. The figure demarcates the region of C > 1
(shaded green) from the region of C < 1 (shaded pink) by the
boundary curve C = 1 (in red).
The conditions on λ1 and λ2 say that in the region above the
λ1 = λ2 diagonal and λ1 < 1, demarcated by the green dashed
borders, loss coverage under pooling is always higher than that
under full risk classification. This is true irrespective of the relative
sizes and relative risks of the higher and lower risk populations.
Fig. 3 highlights another important point: that Result 5.2 fo-
cuses only on loss coverage inside the region demarcated by green
dashes. Outside this region, loss coverage under pooling can be
higher or lower than under full risk classification (higher in the
green segments to the right of the dashed green lines; lower
throughout the pink area towards the right). The position of the
C = 1 curve which demarcates the pink and green areas changes
slightlywith relative population sizes and relative risks. The region
demarcated by green dashes is the only region for which we
can obtain a universal result (i.e. one which holds independent
of relative sizes and risks of higher and lower risk populations).
Fortuitously, empirical evidence and economic rationale imply that
realistic values of (λ1, λ2) may often fall within this region.
A proof of Result 5.2 is given in Appendix C.
5.3. General demand elasticity functions
So far, we have only considered constant demand elasticities
(as a function of premium), either for all individuals in the pop-
ulation, or for all individuals belonging to a particular risk-group.
However, it can be argued that demand elasticities should actually
be increasing functions of premium (instead of being a constant),
to reflect the income effect on demand; the argument being that at
higher prices, insurance forms a larger part of the consumer’s total
budget constraint. In this section, we generalise our analysis to
allow for different demand elasticity functions, ϵi(π ), for different
risk-groups i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Using Eq. (9), the proportional demand for insurance, for risk-
group i, is:
di(π ) = τi exp
[
−
∫ π
µi
ϵi(s) d log s
]
, for i = 1, 2, . . ., n. (33)
Under this formulation, the equilibrium condition under risk pool-
ing with premium π0 gives:
n∑
i=1
piτi exp
[
−
∫ π0
µi
ϵi(s) d log s
]
(π0 − µi) = 0, (34)
or, equivalently:
n∑
i=1
αi exp
[∫ µi
π0
ϵi(s) d log s
]
(π0 − µi) = 0; (35)
in which the term:∫ µi
π0
ϵi(s) d log s, (36)
can be interpreted using the concept of arc elasticity of demand,
denoted by ηi(a, b) and defined in Vazquez (1995) as follows:
ηi(a, b) =
∫ b
a ϵi(s) d log s∫ b
a d log s
. (37)
Arc elasticity, ηi(a, b), can be interpreted as the average value of
(point) elasticity of demand for risk-group i, ϵi(s), over the price
logarithmic arc fromprice a to price b. So in our case,we can define:
λi = ηi(π0, µi) =
∫ µi
π0
ϵi(s) d log s∫ µi
π0
d log s
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (38)
Eq. (35) can then be rewritten using arc elasticities as follows:
n∑
i=1
αi exp
[
λi
∫ µi
π0
d log s
]
(π0 − µi) = 0, or, equivalently: (39)
n∑
i=1
αi
(
µi
π0
)λi
(π0 − µi) = 0. (40)
Note that Eq. (40) is identical in form to Eq. (29), but with the
relevant arc elasticities substituted for point elasticities.
The general result, as stated below, then follows directly from
Result 5.2:
Result 5.3. Suppose there are n risk groups with risks µ1 < µ2 <
· · · < µn with demand elasticities ϵ1(π ), ϵ2(π ), . . . , ϵn(π ), such
that λ1, λ2, . . . , λn are the respective arc elasticities under pooled
equilibrium. Define λlo = maxv≤1f (v) and λhi = minv>1f (v). Then
λlo < 1 and λhi ≥ λlo ⇒ C ≥ 1.
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In other words, under pooled equilibrium, as long as the arc
elasticities of lower risk-groups (paying more than their fair actu-
arial premium) do not exceed 1 and the arc elasticities of the higher
risk-groups (paying less than their fair actuarial premium) in all
cases exceed those of the lower risk-groups, then loss coverage
under pooling is higher than under full risk classification.
For the special case of ϵi(π ) being non-decreasing functions of
premium π and bounded above by 1, where ϵ1(π ) ≤ ϵ2(π ) ≤
· · · ≤ ϵn(π ) the required conditions for Result 5.3 are automatically
satisfied. This is because the arc elasticities of demand, being an
average of the underlying point elasticities, satisfy: 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤
· · · ≤ λn < 1, which then implies that λlo < 1 and λhi ≥ λlo and
thus C ≥ 1.
6. Discussion
6.1. Full take-up of insurance
In Section 5,we havemade an implicit assumption that demand
for insurance at the pooled equilibrium premium is strictly less
than 1 for all risk-groups. However, for sufficiently small pooled
equilibrium premium, it is possible to envisage a situation where
all individuals in particular high risk-groupsmight purchase insur-
ance.
It turns out that the same framework as in Section 5 can also
be used to analyse the case of full take-up of insurance by certain
risk-groups and the results of Section 5 can be easily generalised
for these cases. We have discussed this special case in Appendix D.
6.2. Empirical estimates
The results obtained in Section 5 suggest that loss coverage will
be higher under pooling than under full risk classification, if
1. elasticity (or arc elasticity, if elasticity is not constant) is less
than 1 for all lower risk-groups; and
2. elasticity (or arc elasticity, if elasticity is not constant) for all
higher risk-groups exceeds that for all lower risk-groups,
where arc elasticities are logarithmic averages of demand elastic-
ities over the arc, from true risk price to the equilibrium pooled
price.
Are these conditions likely to be satisfied in the real world?
For the first condition, Table 1 shows some relevant empirical
estimates for insurance demand elasticities.4 It can be seen that
most estimates are of magnitude significantly less than 1. Whilst
the various contexts in which these estimates were made may not
correspond closely to the set-up in this paper, the figures are at
least suggestive of the possibility that the first conditionmay often
be satisfied.
For the second condition, we know of no empirical evidence
that insurance demand elasticities are higher (or lower) for higher
risks. However, as noted earlier in the paper, this conditionmay be
plausible in that it is consistent with the income effect on demand.
6.3. Applicability of results
In the derivation of proportional demand from heterogeneous
individual preferences in Section 3, we made assumptions that all
individuals had the same initial wealth W and the same potential
loss amount L. It is worth noting that the results about demand
functions in Section 5 apply more generally. In particular, if the
4 Demand elasticity is defined as a positive constant in this paper for conve-
nience, but estimates in empirical papers are generally givenwith the negative sign,
so Table 1 quotes them in that form.
demand function is given, the results in Section 5 require no as-
sumptions whatsoever about individuals’ initial wealth W . The
form of the demand functions specified in Section 5 does however
require that all individuals have the same potential loss amount L,
and that any insurance fully covers this loss amount.
7. Conclusions
Loss coverage is defined as the expected population losses com-
pensated by insurance at market equilibrium. We suggest that if
the social purpose of insurance is to compensate the population’s
losses, loss coverage may be an intuitively appealing metric for
evaluation of different risk classification schemes.
When risk classification is banned, so that insurers have to
pool all risks at a single price, this can lead to adverse selection.
Adverse selection is associated with a fall in the number of insured
individuals compared with that obtained under full risk classifi-
cation. However, adverse selection is also associated with a shift
in coverage towards higher risks. If the shift is large enough, it
can more than offset the fall in numbers insured, so that loss
coverage is increased. We suggest that from a social perspective,
this possibility might be seen as a good outcome from adverse
selection.
Whether loss coverage is in fact increased when all risks are
pooled depends on the response of higher and lower risks to
changes in the prices they face, that is the demand elasticities of
higher and lower risks.
This paper has stated demand elasticity conditions which en-
sure that loss coverage will be higher under pooling than under
fully risk-differentiated premiums. The conditions were stated for
successively more general contexts: first, for iso-elastic demand
with a single elasticity parameter; second, for iso-elastic demand
with different elasticity parameters for different risk-groups; and
third, for any downward-sloping demand functions (including
different ones for different risk-groups). The demand elasticities
required for loss coverage to be higher under pooling seem realistic
for some insurance markets.
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Appendix A. Microfoundation of insurance demand
Suppose all individuals have the same initial wealthW and the
same potential loss amount L (with L ≤ W ), and risk preferences
driven by a power utility function:
Uγ (w) =
[
w − (W − L)
L
]γ
, (41)
so that Uγ (W ) = 1 and Uγ (W − L) = 0. This particular form of
utility function leads to:
relative risk aversion coefficient:
− wU
′′
γ (w)
U ′γ (w)
= (1− γ )
[
w
w − (W − L)
]
. (42)
Given that all individuals have the same W and same L, Eq. (42)
implies that the heterogeneity in preferences between individu-
als can be captured by the randomness of γ , the risk aversion
parameter.5 As outlined in Section 3, we define a positive random
5 In the special case W = L, Eq. (42) reduces to (1 − γ ), the familiar case of
constant relative risk aversion.
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Table 1
Estimates of demand elasticity for various insurance markets.
Market & country Demand elasticities Authors
Term life insurance, USA −0.66 Viswanathan et al. (2006)
Yearly renewable term life, USA −0.4 to−0.5 Pauly et al. (2003)
Whole life insurance, USA −0.71 to−0.92 Babbel (1985)
Health insurance, USA 0 to−0.2 Chernew et al. (1997),
Blumberg et al. (2001),
Buchmueller and Ohri (2006)
Health insurance, Australia −0.35 to−0.50 Butler (1999)
Farm crop insurance, USA −0.32 to−0.73 Goodwin (1993)
variable Γ , and individual risk preferences γ are then instances
drawn from the distribution of Γ .
Inserting the utility function in Eq. (41) into Eq. (7), the demand
for insurance at a given premium π is then:
d(π ) = P [UΓ (W − πL) > 1− µ] , (43)
= P [(1− π )Γ > 1− µ] , (44)
= P [Γ log(1− π ) > log(1− µ)] , as log is monotonic, (45)
= P
[
Γ <
log(1− µ)
log(1− π )
]
, as log(1− π ) < 0. (46)
≈ P
[
Γ <
µ
π
]
, as log(1− x) ≈ −x, for small x. (47)
So for small premium and probability of loss, the underlying ran-
dom variable Γ has the following distribution function:
FΓ (γ ) = P [Γ < γ ] = d
(
µ
γ
)
, (48)
where γ = µ/π . Note that FΓ (γ ) is a non-decreasing function and
lies between 0 and 1.
Of course, for FΓ to be a valid distribution function, we would
also require limγ→0FΓ (γ ) = 0 and limγ→∞FΓ (γ ) = 1, or equiv-
alently, limπ→∞d(π ) = 0 and limπ→0d(π ) = 1, which appear to
be reasonable assumptions. However, empirical observations are
unlikely to be available for these extreme cases, so it is only pos-
sible to model insurance purchasing behaviour over the range of
premiumsobserved in themarket,with appropriate extrapolations
at the limiting extremes.
We formally present this result as follows:
Result A.1. Given an observed proportional insurance demand, d(π ),
which is a valid probability and non-increasing in π , heterogeneity of
risk preferences driven by the power utility function and characterised
by the random parameter Γ with the distribution function given
by Eq. (48) produces the observed demand for insurance for small
premiums.
We illustrate the above result using iso-elastic demand: Sup-
pose Γ has the following distribution:
FΓ (γ ) = P [Γ ≤ γ ] =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if γ < 0
τ γ λ if 0 ≤ γ ≤ (1/τ )1/λ
1 if γ > (1/τ )1/λ,
(49)
where τ and λ are positive parameters. Note that τ = λ = 1 leads
to a uniform distribution. λ controls the shape of the distribution
function and τ controls the range over which Γ takes its values.
Then the demand for insurance, as given in Eq. (48), takes the form:
d(π ) = τ
(µ
π
)λ
, (subject to a cap of 1) (50)
which corresponds to iso-elastic demand, the constant demand
elasticity being:
ϵ(π ) = −∂ log(d(π ))
∂ logπ
= λ. (51)
The parameter τ can also be interpreted as the fair-premium de-
mand, that is the demand when an actuarially fair premium is
charged.
Note that since the pooled equilibriumpremiummust be some-
where in between the lowest and highest true risks, the demand
formula in Eq. (50) is required only for this feasible range. Hence it
does not matter that the formula could imply unrealistic demand
outside this range.
Appendix B. Equal iso-elastic demand elasticities
Using the formulation of Section 5.1, we prove the following
result.
Result B.1. Let V be a positive random variable and λ be a positive
constant, such that E
[
V λ
] = E [V λ+1]. Then:
λ ⋚ 1⇒ E [V λ] ⋛ E [V ] . (52)
Proof.
Case: λ = 1: It follows directly from the definition.
Case: 0 < λ < 1: Holder’s inequality states that, if 1 < p, q <∞
where 1/p + 1/q = 1, for positive random variables X, Y with
E[Xp], E[Y q] <∞:(
E
[
Xp
])1/p(E [Y q])1/q ≥ E[XY ]. (53)
Setting 1/p = λ, 1/q = 1−λ, X = V λ2 and Y = V 1−λ2 , Holder’s
inequality gives:(
E
[
V λ
2 1
λ
])λ(
E
[
V (1−λ
2) 11−λ
])1−λ ≥ E [V λ2V 1−λ2] , (54)
⇒(E [V λ])λ(E [V λ+1])1−λ ≥ E [V ] , (55)
⇒E [V λ] ≥ E [V ] , since E [V λ] = E [V λ+1] . (56)
Case: λ > 1: Young’s inequality states that, for a, b ≥ 0 and
p, q > 0 such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1:
ab ≤ a
p
p
+ b
q
q
. (57)
Setting p = λ, q = λ
λ−1 , a = V
1
λ and b = V λ− 1λ , Young’s
inequality gives:
V
1
λ V λ−
1
λ ≤ 1
λ
V
1
λ
λ + λ− 1
λ
V (λ−
1
λ
) λ
λ−1 , (58)
⇒V λ ≤ 1
λ
V + λ− 1
λ
V λ+1, (59)
⇒E [V λ] ≤ 1
λ
E [V ]+ λ− 1
λ
E
[
V λ+1
]
, (60)
⇒E [V λ] ≤ E [V ] , since E [V λ] = E [V λ+1] . □ (61)
Result 5.1 follows directly from Result B.1 by noting that: C =
E
[
V λ
]
/E [V ].
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Appendix C. Different iso-elastic demand elasticities
Using the formulation of Section 5.2, we prove the following
result:
Result C.1. Let V be a positive random variable and f (v) be a positive
function, such that E
[
V f (V )
] = E [V f (V )+1]. Define λlo = maxv≤1f (v)
and λhi = minv>1f (v). Then:
λlo < 1 and λhi ≥ λlo ⇒ E
[
V f (V )
] ≥ E [V ] . (62)
Proof. Holder’s inequality states that, if 1 < p, q < ∞ where
1/p + 1/q = 1, for positive random variables X, Y with E[Xp],
E[Y q] <∞:(
E
[
Xp
])1/p(E [Y q])1/q ≥ E[XY ]. (63)
For any λ, such that 0 < λ < 1, set 1/p = λ, 1/q = 1 − λ,
X = V λ f (V ) and Y = V (1−λ)(f (V )+1), Holder’s inequality gives:(
E
[
V f (V )
])λ(
E
[
V f (V )+1
])1−λ ≥ E [V λ f (V )V (1−λ)(f (V )+1)] , (64)
⇒E [V f (V )] ≥ E [V f (V )+1−λ] , since E [V f (V )] = E [V f (V )+1] .
(65)
The relationship in Eq. (65) holds for any positive λ < 1. Now, set
λ = λlo < 1.
Case: V < 1:
λlo = max
v≤1
f (v)⇒ f (V ) ≤ λlo = λ⇒ f (V )+ 1− λ ≤ 1
⇒ V f (V )+1−λ ≥ V . (66)
Case: V = 1:
V f (V )+1−λ = V . (67)
Case: V > 1:
λhi = min
v>1
f (v)⇒ f (V ) ≥ λhi ≥ λlo = λ⇒ f (V )+ 1− λ ≥ 1
⇒ V f (V )+1−λ ≥ V . (68)
Hence, V f (V )+1−λ ≥ V for all cases, which implies
E
[
V f (V )+1−λ
] ≥ E [V ] . (69)
Combining Eqs. (65) and (69), we have:
E
[
V f (V )
] ≥ E [V ] . □ (70)
Result 5.2 follows directly from Result C.1 by noting that the loss
coverage ratio in this case is: C = E [V f (V )] /E [V ].
Appendix D. Full take-up of insurance by high risk-groups at
pooled equilibrium
In Section 5, we have made an implicit assumption that de-
mand for insurance at the pooled equilibrium premium is strictly
less than 1 for all risk-groups. However, for sufficiently small
pooled equilibrium premium, it is possible to envisage a situation
where all individuals in particular high risk-groupsmight purchase
insurance.
In this context, the iso-elastic demand function needs to be
defined as:
di(π ) = min
[
τi
(µi
π
)λi
, 1
]
, i = 1, 2, . . ., n, (71)
so as to ensure that the proportional demand of insurance cannot
exceed 1.
In the light of available empirical evidence, we can realistically
assume that the fair-premium demands for all risk-groups are less
than 1, i.e. τi < 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Under risk pooling, demand for low risk-groups will fall, so de-
mand for low risk-groups cannot exceed 1. However, for high risk-
groups, demand increases under pooling and hence it is plausible
to encounter full take-up of insurance if the pooled premium is
small enough.
This situation can be analysed using the same framework devel-
oped in Section 5 of this paper. For ease of exposition, we present
our analysis here for two risk-groups with iso-elastic demand, but
the analysis can be easily generalised for more than two risk-
groups, and also for general demand elasticity functions as in
Section 5.3.
Suppose under pooling the equilibrium premium, π0, is such
that d2(π0) = 1. Under this set-up, the equilibrium condition in
Eq. (28) becomes:
p1τ1
(
µ1
π0
)λ1
(π0 − µ1)+ p2 (π0 − µ2) = 0 (72)
which can be rewritten as:
p1τ1
(
µ1
π0
)λ1
(π0 − µ1)+ p2τ2
(
µ2
π0
)λ∗2
(π0 − µ2) = 0,
where τ2
(
µ2
π0
)λ∗2 = 1, (73)
for some λ∗2 > 0. The existence of a positive λ
∗
2 is obvious from the
fact that τ2 < 1 and µ2 > π0.
Note that Eq. (73) can be expressed as:
α1
(
µ1
π0
)λ1
+ α2
(
µ2
π0
)λ∗2 = α1(µ1
π0
)λ1+1
+ α2
(
µ2
π0
)λ∗2+1
, (74)
which is equivalent to the formulation in Eq. (29) for n = 2.
Consequently, the equilibrium condition has the same form as
Eq. (31), i.e.:
E
[
V f (V )
] = E [V f (V )+1] , (75)
The implication of the above is that: when the high risk-group has
full insurance, the equilibrium condition and pooled premium is
the same as if the high risk-group had iso-elastic demand with
elasticity parameter λ∗2.
And the loss coverage ratio, for the case of full take-up of
insurance by the high risk-group under pooling, is:
C = LC(π0)
LC(µ)
, (76)
=
p1τ1
(
µ1
π0
)λ1
µ1 + p2µ2
p1τ1µ1 + p2τ2µ2 , (77)
=
p1τ1
(
µ1
π0
)λ1
µ1 + p2τ2
(
µ2
π0
)λ∗2
µ2
p1τ1µ1 + p2τ2µ2 , (78)
= α1v
λ1+1
1 + α2v
λ∗2+1
2
α1v1 + α2v2 , (79)
= E
[
V f (V )+1
]
E [V ]
, (80)
= E
[
V f (V )
]
E [V ]
(since E[V f (V )+1] = E[V f (V )] at equilibrium) (81)
which is the same expression as Eq. (32). This says that the loss
coverage ratio when the high risk-group demand is 1 at equilib-
rium is the same as if the high risk-group had iso-elastic demand
with elasticity parameter λ∗2.
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We can then generalise Result 5.2 to take into account the
possibility of full take-up of insurance for high risk-groups, as
follows:
Result D.1. Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks µ1 < µ2 <
· · · < µn with iso-elastic demand elasticities λ1, λ2, . . . , λn respec-
tively. Define λ∗i to be λi if di(π0) < 1; otherwise set it to a value
such that τi
(
µi
π0
)λ∗i = 1. Then define λlo = maxµi≤π0λ∗i and λhi =
minµi>π0λ
∗
i . Then λlo < 1 and λhi ≥ λlo ⇒ C ≥ 1.
The required condition for Result D.1 is essentially the same as
that of Result 5.2, except that λlo and λhi are defined in terms of λ∗i
rather than λi.
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